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The historic decision of India and Pakistan to start a “composite
dialogue” by holding talks has at last opened the doors for peace in the sub-continent. The precursor to the February talks came after the January meetings between Indian and Pakistani officials held on the sidelines of the South Asian Association for Regional Conference (SAARC) summit. On January 6, 2004, a day after the meeting between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf, the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan released a statement stating that the two countries would hold comprehensive, bilateral negotiations.
The first signs of peace began in November last year when Pakistan and Indian troops stuck to a ceasefire on the international border and in Kashmir. Then came the confidence-building measures (CBMs) with Islamabad and New Delhi taking steps to facilitate cross-border travel and trade. The two governments began talks to begin economic and cultural ties. This was, however, not the first time that India and Pakistan proclaimed a new beginning towards peace. Bilateral talks at the highest level, for example, broke down as early as 1999 and again in 2001.
The rivalry between India and Pakistan dates back to 1947. The feeling of hatred has been fostered by politicians in both countries, for reasons best known to them. Any settlement, naturally, has often had to face strong resistance from economic and political sections in both countries and the military, whose interests are linked closely to a continued state of eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation.
However, this cannot mean that the two leaders, Atal Bihari Vajpayee in India and Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan are not serious. Both have been swayed by the belief that the brinkmanship — which in 2001 brought the two countries to near war and a possible nuclear exchange — has produced little or no geo-political returns. The two leaders, incidentally, have a lot at stake to bring about a rapprochement.
In India, the Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led Bharatiya Janata Party, has made peace with Pakistan a major issue in its election campaign. As for Musharraf, he has promised to go on talking to India, no matter what the risk (he has survived two assassination attempts). This was clear from his first speech at the National Assembly, where he declared that “internal extremists” or fundamentalist terrorists, who have been patronized by the country’s military and other security bodies, posed the greatest threat.
There could be many reasons for the change in the attitude of Pakistan. One is the pressure from the US. However, the other is certainly economical. President Musharraf is afraid that India’s emergence as a prime international investment destination along with its increasing friendship with Washington could turn the tide within his own country against him. There is a general feeling in Pakistan that it would be worthwhile to deal with New Delhi at this point of time when it is a “valued ally” of the Bush administration. Later, with India growing stronger by the day, it would be more difficult to seek peace.
The way President Musharraf has gone hammer and tongs at the terrorists within his country has led to belief that he has had a change of mind. Today, the President of Pakistan believes that his military’s avowed support to fundamentalist extremists in Afghanistan and Kashmir has harmed their interests and even brought Islamabad into conflict with Washington. Added to that are the two attempts on President Musharraf, which turned the bonhomie between the Pakistan army and the terrorists into one of outright distrust and hatred. Top Pakistan government officials were quoted as saying after the second assassination attempt on President Musharraf, as “they (the pro-Kashmir groups) have done the ultimate and turned their guns against us”.
In India, the people want Prime Minister Vajpayee to extract concessions from Islamabad. India can become a great power if it is economically strong. This can be achieved through an economic partnership with the six South Asian states, which are members of SAARC. It was not without reason that a key decision of the SAARC Islamabad summit, was the finalizing of plans to create a South Asian free trade zone over a 10 year-period beginning in 2006. That prompted Pakistan to feel that India was giving up its hegemonic designs over small neighbours and was keen to establish its economic domination in the region.
The peace efforts have gone down well with the US since the moves have given Bush unchallenged military and economic dominance. It is in US interests to woo India because of its economic potential: the country is being hailed as the future “office of the world”. Second and perhaps equally important is the fact that a strong India could serve as a counter to the growing might of China in the region. It was not surprising then to see that soon after the peace breakthrough came, the US said that it was moving forward to the “next steps in strategic partnership” with India in terms of cooperation in non-military nuclear activities, missile defence, etc.
Tough bargaining
The eight paragraph-long statement which signalled the peace process took a long time in the making. It involved half-a-dozen meetings between officials of the two countries. According to those who watched the whole process, at one point of time, it looked as if things would fall apart again when India started demanding that Pakistan must make a solemn promise that it will not allow its territory to be used by terrorists. This Pakistan was not willing to incorporate. However, Pakistan agreed in the end and did not insist that the Kashmiri insurgents were freedom fighters. India, on its part, agreed that Kashmir would be a topic for bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. The earlier Indian stand has been that Kashmir was an internal Indian matter. However, real peace is still far away because the elections in India and the subsequent formation of a new government can only mean that substantive talks with Pakistan will only be possible after June.
The understanding reached at Islamabad between Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan’s military ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, can only be speculated upon. The manner in which the two sides went about in the dialogue at Islamabad was remarkable. India, on its part, opened more and better communication facilities by increasing the number of buses, trains and planes to Lahore, Karachi and other places. If analysts are to be believed, the Indian and Pakistani establishments have opened with clean slates and both countries have realized that the best way to begin would be the economic method. For a long time – almost over fifty years – the two countries had first wanted to settle their government-to-government relations and then talk of more mundane matters like business. This time around, all that has been forgotten and both seem intent to begin with business first and then go on to talk of other matters like country-to-country relations and only after trust and faith develops.
What is important is that this time both countries seemed to have learnt their lessons from the failed Agra Summit of July, 2001. In the January talks between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf decided not to conduct their diplomacy through the media. Ministers and aides from both sides did not do any selective leaks. Nor was there any briefing to journalists. Not until the actual wordings of the statement were out did anyone learn the broad outlines of the understanding arrived at in Islamabad. The only inkling of what transpired behind closed doors was the comment of the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Khurshid Kasuri, who said that the meeting between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf was “so tough, blunt and brutal” that he feared that the talks between India and Pakistan would collapse once again. The fact that they agreed to issue a joint statement was, perhaps, a pointer that the two sides wanted a breakthrough. The statement also indicated that the time had come for a process of reconciliation and and end to the age-old disputes and issues. How successful this whole exercise would be in bringing peace in the region, would depend upon the seriousness as well as the expectations of the two countries.
For the moment, however, Pakistan seems confused. President Musharraf has of late shown his aggressive self once again. He has apparently sent out a warning to India that the Kashmir issue should not be sidetracked in the peace initiative. Whatever it may be, amidst the intelligentsia in Pakistan as well as the general masses, there is a degree of wishful thinking about the possible solution. A feeling has gained ground in Pakistan that General Musharraf might succumb to international pressure and enter into an understanding that will not be in Pakistan’s interest.
The good thing is that there is a sense of realism that Kashmir is not an issue that can be solved by a snap of the fingers. The only way out of the decades-old impasse would be a step-by-step process leading to some sort of a solution sometime in the future. At the same time, there is a certain amount of impatience with the whole process and a desire to find a quick and acceptable solution to the Kashmir issue to reap the benefits of peace.
Certain sections of Pakistani opinion feel that Indians are so keen to do business with Pakistan that a settlement of Kashmir which would be favourable to Pakistan or at the very least, one which will satisfy the Kashmiris, that the issue of Kashmir would be sidestepped and forgotten. These people are led by the decades of indoctrinated suspicion, hostility and hatred.
It is against the backdrop of such conflicting emotions that the people in Pakistan talk about the understanding reached in Islamabad. And it is because of these conflicting emotions, that some senior and responsible people feel that the outcome of the peace process would be completely unrealistic.
The other solution that some Pakistani analysts have been talking about is more realistic, but difficult to implement. This solution talks in terms of the international border being broadly around the current LoC but with major adjustments. This would mean the division of a few districts and a dislocation of the people. Apparently, the adjustments would be done in such a manner that they would keep the security interests of the two sides in mind. This would be easier said than done because such a solution has the capabilities of turning into a political minefield which neither side will be able to walk on.
Many Pakistanis agree, however reluctantly, that there is no solution to the Kashmir issue. They point out that the Kashmir issue is like hypertension (high blood pressure), which can be kept under control but never cured. Both countries, Pakistan and India, therefore must learn to live with the “K” disease, until a final cure is brought about. Such a thought would indeed appeal to India. But therein lies a problem, for while India would like to believe that the two countries can live in peace without necessarily having to solve the Kashmir issue, the Pakistanis feel that peace could bring about a solution to Kashmir.
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