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The 04 December 2011 Duma Election is
becoming a watershed in Russian
politics. The ruling United Russia party
got 49.32 percent of the votes (down 15
percent as compared to 2007), the
Communist Party 19.19 percent, A Just
Russia party 13.24 percent, the LDPR
11.67 percent, Yabloko 3.43 percent,
Patriots of Russia 0.97 percent and the
Right Cause party 0.6 percent. The
opposition, including opposition parties
in parliament, believes that the
official electoral data were falsified
and that the voting itself was marked by
ballot stuffing and the removal of
observers from polling stations. |
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The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation created a political system,
often referred to as ‘super-presidential’ with a powerful president and a
relatively weak parliament. The State Duma (Gosudarstvennaya Duma) is the lower
house of Russian Parliament. Its 450 members are elected through a closed-list,
proportional representation system for four years. The main reason for the
creation of a strong presidency was the exceptional circumstance during the
early nineteen nineties. Boris Yeltsin, the first democratically elected and
pro-reform President of the country, was given extraordinary and emergency
powers – by the then Russian parliament, Congress of People’s Deputies – to deal
with the turbulent and uncertain situation during the last years of the Soviet
Union.
After the Soviet disintegration, he launched a radical economic reform programme
known as the ‘shock therapy’ to transform the Soviet era ‘command economy’ into
a market economy. But the process resulted in near collapse of the economy and
acute hardships for the common people. The Congress of People’s Deputies, was
opposed to the pace and extent of reforms resulting in a fierce power struggle
between the two organs of government. Yeltsin and his supporters tried to
portray the parliament as conservative and anti-reform. The two antagonists had
different versions of the draft constitution. Yeltsin proposed a strong
presidency to take forward the reform process, while his opponents favoured a
stronger parliament. It resulted in a stalemate in September-October 1993,
resolved with the bombardment of the parliament in October 1993. Thereafter, the
draft constitution supported by Yeltsin was approved in a national referendum in
December 1993.
The Uneasy Equation – Duma and the President
In the new constitutional system, the President has a dominant role in the
appointment of the Prime Minister and the council of ministers. He also has
powers to issue decree, which have the same force as legislative acts, and to
veto legislation passed by the Duma. Yeltsin made frequent use of his decree
powers as the first two Dumas (elected in 1993 and 1995) were not very
supportive. The advent of Putin, first as the Prime Minister, and later as the
President in 2000, changed the equation between the Duma and the President.
Putin’s immense popularity (ensuring clear majority for the political party
supported by him in the elections of 1999, 2003 and 2007) coupled with his
tactful handling of the Duma ensured that the legislature became a subordinate
organ of the presidency. Elections were becoming occasions to reiterate Putin’s
continuing hold over the political system and popular imagination. When Putin
announced his intention to return to presidency in 2012, many observers forecast
another dozen odd years for Tsar Putin, which would put him in league with his
role model Peter the Great (who effectively ruled Russia during the first
quarter of the 18th century). Not many anticipated any serious challenge to his
sway over Russian politics and the popularity charts. “Just as observers were
pronouncing it dead, Russian electoral politics suddenly and dramatically came
to life in December 2011”.
Russian Electoral Politics – Coming to Life
The 04 December 2011 Duma Election is becoming a watershed in Russian politics.
The ruling United Russia party got 49.32 percent of the votes (down 15 percent
as compared to 2007), the Communist Party 19.19 percent, A Just Russia party
13.24 percent, the LDPR 11.67 percent, Yabloko 3.43 percent, Patriots of Russia
0.97 percent and the Right Cause party 0.6 percent. The opposition, including
opposition parties in parliament, believes that the official electoral data were
falsified and that the voting itself was marked by ballot stuffing and the
removal of observers from polling stations. This sparked unprecedented public
protest in various parts of the country. The protesters were not just demanding
the cancellation of November’s fraudulent parliamentary election and the removal
of the chief electoral officer, but also major changes in the electoral system.
The Kremlin ordered a probe into these allegations and also promised a set of
political reforms that would ease registration rules for opposition parties and
restore the direct election of governors and individual constituencies. However,
the concessions have failed to placate protesters, who continue (27 Dec) with
their demonstrations. What these elections show is that public opinion still
matters even in the otherwise highly manipulated Putinite system and despite the
barely concealed practice of electoral manipulation. It worked smoothly as long
as Putin enjoyed unrivalled popularity and the manipulation was marginal to the
electoral outcome. But when the leader’s acceptance was sliding, even limited
manoeuvring created an outrage that rattled the regime.
The Potent Instrument of Political Change
The grievance of having been robbed of their democratic rights combined with the
prospect of having to live with the stagnating Putinite system for another
twelve years, added to the long-growing ‘Putin fatigue’ led to the outburst. The
impact of these events on the March 2012 Presidential election are difficult to
predict, but what seemed unthinkable some time back is now a distinct
possibility, certainly a runoff between Putin and another contender for the top
job. Russia may still pass the ultimate test of an electoral democracy, when a
party or person in power is changed through ballot. It also illustrates that
regimes like Russia are in fact more vulnerable than is often thought, with
public opinion being one potent instrument of political change. In such systems
the seemingly weak opposition may become the real challenger and game changer,
if the system at least tolerates multi-party, multi-candidate elections.
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