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The unrest in Tunisia provided the stimulus for wider turbulence in the region.
In a chain reaction, discontent surfaced soon in Egypt. Egyptian activists
organised a protest demonstration against emergency law on 25 January 2011, the
country’s Police Day. The day marks the killing of 50 officers by the British
authorities in Ismailia. The trouble in Egypt quickly escalated and ultimately
forced the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak by 13 February. Mubarak is now
sequestered in the town of Sharmal Sheikh along with his family facing trial,
interalia, for premeditated murder of peaceful protesters. He faces a grim
future. Mubarak did make efforts to gain time by announcing that he would not
seek re-election in the forthcoming September 2011 elections, but that he would
retain office till then. The pressure generated by the protests, however,
precluded the possibility of his retaining office.
The country has since then been ruled by the Supreme Council for the Armed
Forces, headed by its Chairman, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. The first
and second phases of parliamentary elections were conducted on November 28 and
December 14 respectively, with Presidential elections to follow in March or
April 2012. The preliminary results of the Parliamentary elections have seen the
election of Islamic Party candidates, both the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the
ultra conservative Salafis, and arguments have already started between them on
the extent of the application of Islamic Law (Shariah) in the country.
Predictably, the interim government, representing the Liberals, has postponed
further announcement of the results.
Understanding the Complex Domestic Scenario
It would be prudent to recall that most of the Presidents of Egypt, with the
notable exception of Anwar Sadat, have been from the Armed Forces. There is a
feeling in Egypt that only a military figure can handle the country’s troubled
legacy left to the country in politics. The leadership in Egypt, since the time
of Abdul Gamal Nasser, has made sustained efforts to assert the distinctively
‘Egyptian’ character, history and culture of the country, as far as Egypt’s
domestic scenario is concerned. The efforts have been to reaffirm the ‘secular’
character and the traditions of the country. Egypt now has an 80 million strong
population, with a 94 percent Muslim majority. Only 6 percent of the population
comprise Coptic and other minorities. It is significant to note that a section
of the Coptic minorities sided with the protesters.
Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood
The Islamist parties in the country, spearheaded by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)
or the Ikhwan al Musalmeen, which have a mass popular base, insist that Islamic
Law (or the Shariah) be promulgated in Egypt, instead of the ‘foreign’, and
therefore, unfamiliar concept adopted by the Government. The history of Egypt
has been replete with clashes between the Government and the Islamists, headed
by the MB. The MB was the brainchild of ideologue Hassan al Banna (1904-49). The
party was initially formed as a youth club, which first aimed only at
implementing moral and social reform among the people and doing good work. Its
popularity grew rapidly as the party had tremendous mass appeal and it soon
assumed a political role in Egypt as it was set up in Ismailya, the Headquarters
of the (British) Suez Canal Company and of British troops in Egypt.
The MB’s transformation into a political entity came after the 1936 Anglo
Egyptian Treaty and Palestinian protests against the British Mandate and the
Zionist colonisation. In 1939, the MB assumed a truly Islamic agenda, based on
religion. Since then, it has enjoyed tremendous popular appeal, and has educated
and influential people among its ranks. Subsequently, it has constantly been in
conflict with the Egyptian Government, which has consciously rejected the call
for a return to the values of Islam in all spheres. The confrontation has only
grown over time, even though the Government has at times sought to placate MB,
by letting it return to the mainstream political arena. However, the intention
of the MB is firm, it has utilised each such amnesty to infiltrate the Armed and
Security Forces, as well as the bureaucracy, forcing the government to carry out
purges at regular intervals to rid these bodies of such elements as well as
executing MB ideologues, like Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who had reached an almost
iconic status.
Anwar Sadat chose to give the MB political representation as “independents”,
which was resented by the more orthodox members of the party, who broke away
from the MB to form clandestine groups. Prominent among them were the Jihad,
Mukfirtiya (Denouncers of the Infidels), Jundallahi (Soldiers of God),
Munnazzmat al Jihad (the Jihad Organisation), Manaa al Mounkar (Forbid the
Evil), Naguin min al Nar (People who will not go to Hell), Al Tayssir, Al
Shawkin and the Takfir w’al Hijra (the Denunciation and the Migration).
Takfir members, by choice, maintain a reclusive lifestyle, are more in the
nature of a sect than a movement, and are responsible for a series of bombings
and attacks on bars and nightclubs in Egypt. They are also known to have
organised kidnappings and the execution of hostages when the Government did not
accede to their demands. Sadat was constrained to crackdown on radical groups in
1981, following the rift with these groups after reaching a peace accord with
Israel, independent of other Arab countries. Sadat paid the ultimate price for
this crackdown when, in October 1981, he was assassinated by 24-year-old
Lieutenant Khalid Ahmad al Islambouli and three colleagues, all members of the
Munnazzmat al Jihad, in a revenge killing for arresting Khalid’s brother,
Mohammad, the Head of the Takfir. The Munnazzmat was then led by Omar Abdul
Rahman, a blind cleric, who gained notoriety in 1993, for the first bombing of
the World Trade Centre in New York. After a spell in jail, Rahman was released;
he then broke away from the Munnazzmat to form Al Gama’a al Islamiya (AGAI),
which was also joined by a number of Egyptian Mujahedeen returning from the
Afghanistan ‘Jihad’. The return of this element marked an increase in the level
of technology available to the AGAI in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Democracy or Islamic Fundamentalism
The executive has been firm in rejecting this demand since any regression into
Islamic Law would end the present character of the country and, inter alia,
spell the end of Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, which would carry its own
serious implications. It is almost certain that its establishment in Egypt will
not deviate from the secular path already chosen by them. It is just as certain
that the Islamic Fundamentalist element, having the classical example of the
success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran before them, will continue to hunger
for political power, and will, as a first step, continue to call for the
implementation of the Shariah in all Muslim majority countries. Whatever the
results of the Parliamentary elections, the ‘Sphinx’ will be left considerably
shaken and stirred, with the country opting for a return to Islamic
fundamentalist rule. This would upset the long term plans of countries like the
US, which have a considerable commitment to the continuation of a secular
government in Egypt. A return of Egypt to orthodox Islamic rule, would, inter
alia also rewrite the regional power equation.
More Protests and Confrontations
The most recent round of unrest in Egypt, starting November 2011 and earmarked
by the ‘million strong march’ by protesters at Tahrir (Liberation) Square, has
seen the MB come out openly once again against the existing military government.
The basic causes of the unrest remain unchanged: people are protesting the long
standing emergency laws in the country, police brutality in crowd control and
widespread corruption. People are also agitated at the high unemployment
existing in the country, low minimum wages and the runaway inflation in food
prices. The military government has made some concessions but has so far
insisted on retaining political power, something that is opposed by the people
with increasing vehemence. The Presidential elections have been brought forward
to early next year, but the trouble continues unabated, with the protesters
demanding a handover to a civilian government.
The nature of this civilian government and the laws that would govern the
country are now becoming the focus of a new confrontation between the liberals
and Islamist elements in Egypt. Given the mass base the Islamist elements enjoy
in Egypt, significant gains for the MB were very much on the cards if the
elections were free and fair. It remains to be seen whether the armed forces,
which have consciously built up Egypt’s secular polity over the years, will step
back gracefully or, as in the case of Turkey earlier, refuse to allow the
country to regress into Islamic law, and annul the results of the elections.
Though it is yet early days since after the parliamentary elections in Egypt, an
announcement of the complete election results has already been postponed by the
interim government after the strong showing by the Islamists and a sweep by them
in the first phase of the elections.
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