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In the biggest expansion in its 47-year-old history, the EU took in 10 new members—Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta—creating a huge regional bloc with a total population of 450 million. The accession treaty signed on 1 May 2004 is being considered by Euro watchers as a significant move towards a strong and powerful Europe rising to the political and economic challenges of the new world order after September 11 and the ‘liberation of Iraq’. The expansion has sparked debates of a unified Europe as an economic and political alternative to the Hobbesian might of America.
The European Union is one of the oldest and by far the largest regional integration project. The integration process started much before the era of liberalised global economy was initially motivated by intra-European security and political stability, economic reconstruction and social concerns after World War II. It was both politically directed and market driven within the then dominant social-democratic system and state-regulated economic model.
In the aftermath of World War II, USA dominated world economy, accounting for over half of the total world output. And profit rates were at record levels in all major capitalist powers. But by the mid 1970s the post-war boom collapsed. Even the much-trumpeted boom of the nineties could not restore growth and profit levels to those of the post-war era. This led to sustained attacks on working-class living standards that bore the brunt of heavy taxation and a heightening of tension between the major powers. USA now faces concerted competition from the EU and Japan, and in the long term perhaps fears the rise of China.
Can the European challenge become a political and economic alternative to the US in the new world order post-September 11?
The United States of America and Europe are fundamentally different today. Americans generally favour policies of coercion rather than persuasion, the stick over the carrot, and tend to seek finality in international affairs. At times, with scant regard for international laws and institutions such as the United Nations they operate outside its strictures when they deem it necessary.
When it comes to the use of force, mainstream American Democrats have more in common with Republicans than they do with most European Socialists and Social Democrats. Since the 1990s, the Clinton and the present Bush administration have bombed Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan. Even American liberals do not preclude the possibility of force and have a more Manichean perception of the world than most of their European counterparts. European governments, it is safe to say, would not have done so.
Compared to Americans, the Europeans see a more complex picture, when confronting real or potential adversaries. Europeans insist they approach problems with greater sophistication and diplomacy. They try to influence others through subtlety and indirection. They are more tolerant of failure, more patient when solutions don’t come quickly. They generally favour peaceful responses to problems, preferring negotiation and persuasion to coercion. European statesmen extol the virtues of commerce as the soothing balm of international strife, and prefer appeals to international law and international opinion over force.
In the light of different approaches to world affairs across the Atlantic, EU’s first-ever security doctrine gives forbearance to the future of the Union as an alternative to America. Hammered out in six weeks by EU foreign policy supremo Javier Solana, the paper entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ underlines the bloc’s belief in using diplomacy and the UN to fight off new threats.
The main premise of the 15-page document is simple enough : “As a union of 25 states, with over 450 million people, producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product, the European Union is, like it or not, a global actor; it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security.” The end of the Cold War has left the USA in a dominant military position, the doctrine admits. But it warns: “No single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems entirely on its own.” With EU’s defence budget a staggering 160 billion euro a year, the paper insists that the EU is no military dwarf and can sustain several military operations simultaneously.
Striking a similar note, EU defence ministers meeting in Brussels declared the recently created 60,000 strong European Rapid Reaction Force ready and prepared to take on a full range of humanitarian, peace-keeping and peace-making tasks. The EU and its member states also have intervened to resolve conflicts in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Congo.
To face up to challenges arising from religion-based terrorism, conflicts in the Middle East, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and state failure, the doctrine’s most far-reaching strategy is that of contributing to an international order based on effective multilateralism. To make this possible, the EU should contribute to a stronger UN and act effectively to fulfil its responsibilities.
Breaking new ground, for a Union often derided as a soft power, the strategy recognises that quick and robust intervention may be needed to fend off the most dangerous threats to global security. There is also the question of matching political rhetoric with military might. Aware that the US only respects military power, Solana’s doctrine struggles to bury American perceptions of the EU as a military weakling.
The Europeans, better acquainted with the labyrinthine socio-political landscape of the region are, however, wary of Bush’s unbridled rhetoric of “spreading the untamed fire of freedom” to the region. If ignited, they fear, the flame of freedom might consume more than the so-called “despised” Arab regimes.
Rise of the old guard
Europe—with the exception of Britain, which is still torn between two continents—is actively seeking to strengthen its political and economic capabilities that serve as a source of anxiety for the US in its quest for global hegemony. Europe’s involvement in China is a cause of concern to the US on an economic level too. Central banks, led by the People’s Bank of China, are in fact financing about 75-85 percent of the US current account deficit (a gigantic US$164.7 billion), which is causing the Central Bank of China to suffer rising economic losses in view of the continuing devaluation of the dollar (a capital loss equivalent to 10 percent of Chinese GDP).
In the climate of Chinese-European rapprochement, USA rightly fears that China may decide to move into the stronger Euro as an alternative reserve currency, particularly since Europe is already a bigger market for Chinese goods than the US. This would spell trouble for USA, as an increasing number of central banks across the world are shifting from the dollar to the European single currency, making it harder for the US to finance its massive current account deficit.
Even where the two appear to speak in harmony, as on the question of Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, they remain committed to divergent agendas and strategies. To the Americans, wresting Lebanon from Syria is essential for the removal of Hizb Allah’s political cover (which France has objected to including in the European list of terrorist organisations) as a prelude to its planned attack on the Iranian regime. To the French, however, reclaiming Lebanon is part of France’s ongoing struggle to regain its influence on its old colonies. Lebanon would be the foothold France needs to restore its declining Francophone project in the Middle East, in the face of rampant Anglo-Saxonism.
Far from trailing the American behemoth, the world appears to be pressing in the opposite direction. The world order, as we know it for over a decade, seems to be disintegrating into a multitude of powers, each striving to bolster its economic and political mechanisms, strengthen its military capabilities, and assert itself in the face of American “hyper power.”
The incorporation of the US into an effective multilateral international order is a great challenge to the European Union. Also, if a more secure world requires domestic changes in autocratic states, the challenge is to boost reform through more coherent and determined policies.
Lastly, as Javier Solana once mentioned, the security doctrine is a tool for action. Time will show its contribution to a fairer, safer and more united world.
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