The Lisbon objectives aimed to render the European economy, based on knowledge, sustainable growth, full employment and social cohesion, the most competitive economy in the world within the decade 2000-2010.

It seems that the famous Lisbon Strategy is not famous at all. The third most ambitious economic project for the future of Europe since the birth of the Common Market in 1957 does not appear to inspire the citizens of Europe.

The two previous major projects were the main goal of the 1985-1992 period, namely the creation of a single market and that of the 1991-1999 period, namely a single currency, the euro. Both projects can be said to have been successful, despite some setbacks and failings. They were both, however, historically important, long-term, high-profile projects.

In the case of the single market the aim was not simply to eliminate barriers to the movement of goods, services and people but also to provide for a strong competition policy, stringent standards for the circulation of goods, policies for consumer and environmental protection, strict provisions for the health and safety of workers and a policy of social and economic cohesion enabling all countries and regions of the Union to benefit from the creation of the single market.

Similarly, the single currency project did not simply aim to provide for the joint exercise of note-issue privilege but also required as a precondition high levels of currency stability (low interest rates and low inflation) and sound financial management (limited government deficits and low levels of public debt). In any case, the single currency was supposed to safeguard economic operators’ purchasing power.

In both cases, achieving these objectives required a revision of the Union’s founding Treaties (an act which demonstrated a strong political will for them to succeed), the creation of governance and management systems both for the market and for the currency and, of course, the support and consent (or at least the tolerance) of European citizens. There was a public debate in all Member States on these issues, including referenda, in which the views and arguments of both supporters and opponents of these two great European ventures were clearly put forward.

Let us now turn our attention to how the Lisbon strategy, process and objectives compare to these two previous European projects.

The Lisbon objectives aimed to render the European economy, based on knowledge, sustainable growth, full employment and social cohesion, the most competitive economy in the world within the decade 2000-2010. For the last five years these broad objectives have been broken down into individual objectives concerning development and growth, employment, education, social cohesion and poverty, research and technology and any other issue you care to imagine. We even set an objective for the number of crèches each country should have in order to promote employment among women. However, the more ambitious and numerous these objectives became, the more the particular means and specific conditions needed to achieve them were lacking. The answer given to the very reasonable question anyone might ask “How are all these objectives going to be achieved?” was that they will be achieved if we successfully implement the policies that we have in any event being implementing until now. In other words, they will be achieved if we consistently apply the rules of the internal market and the corresponding policy of competition, if we consistently apply the Stability Pact, if we correctly implement our strategy for employment, our research and technology policy, etc.

In essence, Lisbon provided only objectives but neither a strategy nor any particular procedure for tackling them other than the existing implementation procedures for Community policies. In contrast to the two previous major projects – the single market and the single currency – which both necessitated a revision of the Treaties and a transfer of the powers of governance to the European institutions for their achievement, not only was no such action deemed necessary for Lisbon but, worse still, neither of the two Treaty revisions which have occurred since the Lisbon objectives were set (the Treaty of Nice and the Constitutional Treaty) involved any substantial changes to the economic governance procedures of the Union.

The revision of the Stability Pact and the new “Lisbon Strategy” method of governance, which were agreed upon in March 2005 did nothing to change this situation.

The political will expressed concerning the two previous projects continues to be absent from the Lisbon objectives. The message contained in the objectives has not inspired European citizens, despite the obvious benefits they bring. This is because the benefits in question are too self-evident. Questioning the replacement of national currencies with an international currency is both practical and understandable. The same goes, of course, for the replacement of national markets by an international market. Conversely, asking citizens whether they prefer full employment to unemployment, competitiveness to deindustrialisation or the protection of the environment to its destruction is unoriginal and derisory. Nobody of course would disagree but neither would anybody consider you were offering them an important project, especially if you did not also explain how you were going to make it work.

The sorry conclusion is that Lisbon has neither friends nor enemies. It has no direct link to the processes of integration and integrated governance of the European economy. It was not linked to the Union’s economic cohesion, it was not linked to the objective of an enhanced Economic Union and it was not linked to the single market and the single currency and presented as the next stage of the same process.

The recent interim revision of the Lisbon Strategy constitutes a more realistic approach to the situation but is also an admission of failure. It discreetly replaces the 2010 objective with three-year programmes. Thus, we shall no longer refer to a project but to a process. It remains to be seen whether or not this process can remove Lisbon from its boundless solitude.

By Anna Diamantopoulou 
Member of Parliament, 
Greece Former European Commissioner for Employment & Social Affairs