The current situation in Sri Lanka is more than a political or a military crisis. It is a crisis of governance (with fairness and equity), a crisis of confidence between the different ethnic groups – all of which threaten the very existence a united and integrated Sri Lanka. What started as linguistic chauvinism (and the reaction to it) has in fact been a prolonged civil war.

Ground Situation

With the Sri Lankan Government (SLG) denying access to domestic and international media, it is difficult to get an unbiased picture of the situation on the ground. However, it seems clear that the SLG’s claim that the fight against the LTTE is 95% over, is close to the truth. But, jumping only 95% across a well would still leave one inside the well. The ability of the LTTE to fight a conventional military operation is almost totally crippled. After the military “extinction” of the LTTE, it would retain the capacity to harass the Sri Lankan state and the Sinhala majority through widespread terrorist incidents.

Mangala Samraveera, a former Foreign Minister, has said in a recent dialogue, “the dark forces of intolerance and extremism have hijacked the ruling party from its centrist agenda and a quasi-military dictatorship is in the making”. “In the guise of waging a war against terrorism, the Rajapakse regime is systematically dismantling the democratic structures.” … “Sinhala chauvinistic politics has always been the raison d’etre of extremist Tamil politics and the openly Sinhala supremacist policies of the present regime are driving even the moderate Tamils to extreme positions.”

The continued emphasis by SLG on a military solution ignores the lessons of history. Any movement by an ethnic minority, essentially based on legitimate grievances of discrimination and perceived suppression, cannot be eradicated totally by military means. Military measures should be accompanied by sincere and sympathetic efforts to address the legitimate grievances and to eliminate (or minimize) any discrimination by the state. Any solution imposed only by military force or majoritarian fiat would neither be effective nor durable.

LTTE

LTTE which, in the early stages, was one of the many parallel Tamil movements that came up in protest against SLG’s discriminatory policies, gradually eliminated or marginalized most other Tamil movements — mainly through the free use of violence and assassination. LTTE has arguably been the most effective champion of the Tamil cause, but its other face of a dreaded terrorist organization does not elicit the same extent of support from the Tamils. However, the reality of LTTE cannot be ignored when attempting any solution to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, though it is still very difficult for India officially to deal with an LTTE led by those involved in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

LTTE’s alternating tirades against and appeals to the international community and the Tamils in south India, as well as the repeated appeals for support from Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora, display elements of frustration and desperation at the present situation. The stage has come when LTTE should undertake a serious exercise of introspection, taking into account all the realities, and decide whether or not to continue using violent means and to pursue the dream of Tamil Eelam. All outside elements should try and make it easier for LTTE make this decision and the necessary transition.

India and the international community desire that the LTTE should join the democratic mainstream. Remembering the past pattern of behaviour of the LTTE, none of them would be prepared (or be able) to provide any credible guarantee for the LTTE’s commitment to any negotiated peaceful solution with the imminent silencing of the LTTE’s heavy weapons (albeit with the retention of its terrorist capabilities), the LTTE would now require a credible political voice. Could the TNA possibly meet this need?

Indian Approach

India and Sri Lanka are physically separated by a narrow strip of sea, but the peoples of the two countries are bound together by bonds of geographic proximity, historical ties, religious and cultural affinities and similarities etc. State level relations tend to fluctuate from time to time, influenced by domestic political compulsions, international situation, economic needs etc. It is, however, not difficult to perceive that India’s long-term strategic and regional interests require a special relationship with Sri Lanka, beyond the Tamil ethnic issue.

India should reasonably be expected to make her overall national interest the primary and supreme consideration in formulating foreign and security policies. Domestic politics and partisan interests would continue to provide major inputs during the stage of consultations, but are unlikely to become reasons for casting doubts on the credibility of the evolved national foreign policy. The regional political parties in Tamil Nadu often find it difficult to adopt moderate positions on Sri Lanka related issues, lest they surrender ground to the more radical amongst them. The political wing of the LTTE continues to make efforts to exploit this linguistic affinity.

India cannot shrug off her moral responsibility to support the aspiration of the Tamils to be ‘equal’ citizens of Sri Lanka. A separate sovereign state of Tamil Eelam is not a viable option that India can support, as it has the potential of becoming a focus for pan-Tamil parochialism and nationalism.

It has been India’s sad experience over the decades that, different Sri Lankan governments have been insensitive to India’s security concerns, whenever Colombo felt itself strong enough not to need any Indian assistance. India cannot be blamed if she is conscious of this reality when getting involved in any manner in the Sri Lankan imbroglio.

Way Forward

The mindset in New Delhi is that one has to deal only with the SLG and keep on applying pressure on it. The reality has to be recognized that SLG is really not in total control of the situation. India cannot also deny that the LTTE and other Tamil organizations have definite inputs to make, if a lasting solution is to be reached.

It is unrealistic to expect any meaningful solution to originate from the major protagonists in Sri Lanka. The recent elections to two Provincial Assemblies (Central & North West) could unfortunately be interpreted by the SLG as a mandate to continue the policy of ‘eliminating’ the LTTE. The LTTE, on its part, would not want to be seen as capitulating under military pressure. This is where India can and should play a positive role. The Government of India has already stated that India will try and arrange for talks if the SLG stops military operations and LTTE declares its readiness to lay down arms. India could go one step further and make an open appeal (or demand) to the SLG and the LTTE to cooperate in the ‘rescue’ of tens of thousands of innocent Tamils stranded in the combat zone. India could offer to help in this rescue operation, under monitoring by ICRC. Simultaneously, India should apply pressure on President Rajapakse to take (or at least announce) measures to convince the majority of the Tamils that their legitimate grievances and aspirations would be attended to, without their having to resort to coercive actions; and that the Tamil community would be equal to the others, both in prospects and processes. President Rajapakse and his supporters should display the courage and vision to take the initial steps unilaterally and hope that the rest of the Sinhala leaders and the Tamils would respond favourably to those gestures of reconciliation. Terminology like ‘unitary”, ‘federal’, ‘self-determination’ etc. could be jettisoned and pragmatic efforts made — placing the overall interests of an integrated Sri Lankan State above those of individuals, parties etc. Any such package should give legal sanctity to Sri Lanka being a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country. It should address all major grievances of all ethnic minorities and meet their minimum legitimate aspirations — particularly relating to equality of all citizens (under the law and in reality); inclusive economic development; and constitutionally-sanctioned, and significant participation in their own governance.

One issue that may continue to be a major irritant in Indo-Sri Lankan relations, even after the Tamil issue is contained, relates to Kachchativu. The issue is really less about ownership and sovereignty over a small island than about fishing rights around it. In a recent study, a gist of which is available at www.southasiaanalysis.org, certain innovative approaches have been suggested, and they merit being considered seriously.

Conclusion

With wisdom, maturity and tolerance, President Rajapakse now has the rare opportunity to rebuild Sri Lanka into an island of peace. Can he display the required qualities of leadership to grab this opportunity and ensure his place in history? Let us hope so.

* R. Swaminathan is an expert on India’s security and foreign policies, with special emphasis on terrorism, China and Sri Lanka. He is currently President &DG, International Institute of Security and Safety Management (New Delhi) and also Vice President of Chennai Centre for China Studies. R.Swaminathan joined the Indian Police Service in 1954 and retired in 1990. He retired as Special Secretary, DG (Security), Cabinet Secretariat, and Government of India.