Lt Gen V. K. Singh PVSM (retd), a former Director General Military Operations of Indian Army, is a member of the Executive Council of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses. He has seen the 1962 Sino-Indian war from close quarters. A keen observer of strategic and military affairs, he puts Sino-Indian relations under the microscope of his experienced eye to summarise the key issues which would eventually decide the future of the nature of relationship between the two giants of Asia.

There is justifiable satisfaction in Indian circles on the PM’s visit to China. Justifiable, because a number of important agreements have been signed, and more importantly, the moribund talks on the border issue are poised to revive with the appointment of high-powered political intermediaries. However, in all the reports, since the visit, there is no mention of whether the security concerns of each vis-à-vis the other were discussed, and if they were, what was the outcome. India’s security concerns in relation with China basically focus on two aspects; the first, the Chinese efforts to encircle India by military client states around it, and the second, a more broader concern is China’s modernisation of its conventional forces. A brief examination of these factors, and the impact, if any, of the growing warmth in Sino Indian relations will have on them, merits consideration.

Chinese South Asia Military Linkages

China continues to provide arms and training to the armed forces of Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Out of these, China has most extensive contacts with Myanmar and Bangladesh. These linkages combined with the extensive linkages with Pakistan, ring India all around its periphery in South Asia. While India’s smaller neighbours even with Chinese military assistances pose no military threat, a possible future danger, is Chinese access to bases, particularly air and naval in these countries - this would pose a threat to India’s security. It must, however, be noted that these smaller neighbours have entered into arms deals with China not because of any animus against India, but due to the fact that China was their only real source of supply. They cannot afford to buy from Western sources and India is incapable and unwilling to meet their requirements, thus forcing them to approach China.

Chinese arms supplies and military aid to Pakistan predates its contact with India’s other neighbours and stretches back to early 1960s. As an aftermath of the Sino Indian War of 1962, China decided that its enemy’s enemy, Pakistan must be cultivated as friend and ally. This was further reinforced by the Chinese-USSR split, and Chinese assessment that India was an ally of the Russians and therefore, needed to be contained. Since the 1980s another factor played a role in the Chinese attitude to Pakistan, and that was to prevent Pakistan from completely sliding into the U.S. camp. It is often not realised that it is not U.S. weapons which are Pakistan’s main strength, but it is weapons supplied by China. About 80 percent of Pakistan’s armed forces are based on Chinese equipment, as are 60 percent of its military aircraft. This long-standing relationship continues and the changed Sino Indian relations could hardly affect Pakistan-Chinese military links and are less likely to be affected in the near future.

However, what is more worrying to India is the aid rendered by China to Pakistan in developing its nuclear and missile forces. This is also surprising, as all other nuclear powers have zealously guarded their nuclear know-how and not shared it even with allies. It would appear, even even with allies. It would appear, even though it has never been so stated, that India’s nuclear programme worried China and to contain India on this front also, it decided to aid Pakistan. Given the embarrassment, China has suffered by revelations of its nuclear proliferation activities, it appears that this aspect of Sino-Pak collaboration may now taper off. This tapering off is triggered by the fears that nuclear weapon technology supplied to Pakistan could fall into wrong hands; the Pak-North Korea missiles for nuclear technology deal being an example.

Therefore, irrespective of whatever improvement takes place in the Sino Indian relations China will continue to expand its military relations with other States in South Asia, particularly with Pakistan. It must be realised that just as India sees China as the only potential military threat, China sees India in the same light. Even though it may be suspicious of Pakistan’s fundamentalist leanings, it also sees that its influence over the Pakistani military could play a moderating role. However, while military contacts continue, politically, China has begun to distance itself from Pakistan. It no longer gives Pakistan unconditional support on Kashmir but urges discussion and moderation. China could well play a ‘behind the scenes’ role in persuading Pakistan to take a more pragmatic view of a possible solution to the J&K problem.

As far as India is concerned, it needs to realise, that any dramatic change in Chinese military policies and linkages in our immediate neighbourhood is unlikely. India needs to learn to live with, ignore, or contain these linkages, with minimum effort and break out of the self imposed shackles of South Asia.

Chinese Military Modernisation

Military modernisation was one of the four ‘modernisations’ propounded by Deng Xiao Peng in the 1970s and since then, it has remained one of the focal points of all Chinese 5 Year Plans. The Gulf War of 1991 was a watershed in Chinese military thinking as China realised how far it was from a modern army both in technology and in military doctrines. Since then, China has single-mindedly pursued a quest for modernisation of its armed forces, not just in hardware (weapons and equipment) but also in its doctrines, training and organisation. Its aim is to have a commercial military to match any global power. China has also realised that if it is to militarily influence its neighbourhood, it needs to develop the ability to project such power and in the pursuit of this it has set about raising special forces, acquiring air to air refueling capability and above all developing a blue water navy.

As far as India is concerned it needs to watch the Chinese modernisation and to ensure that it does not fall behind the Chinese in acquisition and use of modern military technologies. If the border question is satisfactorily solved, then the chances of a direct military confrontation between India and China reduce considerably. What could create military stress, however, is the possibility of Chinese naval activity expanding itself into the Indian Ocean particularly in the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea. India needs to seriously study this aspect, build up its naval forces and linkages with other Navies in the region, particularly of those of South East Asia, Australia, South Africa and the Gulf States. India need not be a challenger to China, but must be able to contain its military, if it attempts to influence in areas of India’s vital interests, such as South East Asia, South West Asia and Eastern and Southern Africa.

Countering Terrorism

An area where India and China could cooperate is in countering terrorism. Both face a danger from terrorism perpetuated by followers of militant Islam, China, albeit to a lesser degree. Even though China may not openly acknowledge, it knows that the epicentre of terrorism in the area is Pakistan. Given the close contact between the military of China and Pakistan, China has the ability, if it so wishes, to exert pressure on Pakistan to forego terrorism as a factor of its state policy and to disband and control terrorists network operating from its territory. These networks are active not only against India but also in Sinkiang, the Central Asian Republics and even Chechneya. China and India can also share information and take action against the physical movement of terrorists, flow of funds and arms. Curbing terrorism, irrespective of the target, could be in China’s self interest, and thus, is an area where India must try and build a cooperative approach with China.

Boundary Question

While there would always be a competitive element in Sino India relations, the main factor for military tension between the two has been the boundary dispute. For some time, the approach has been to put it on the ‘backburner’, while developing and improving relationships in other spheres, particularly the economic field. This may well have been the right approach to build an atmosphere conducive for dealing with this contentious issue. One is glad that both sides seem to have realised that as long as the issue stays alive it will remain a festering sore, liable to erupt at the slightest provocation.

The decision to deal seriously with this issue is therefore, welcome. It is particularly in India’s interest that the problem is solved and an agreed and delimitated international boundary between India and China is established. It is only when this takes place that India can seriously contemplate reduction of forces deployed on the Eastern Frontiers and consequent economies that such a step would generate.

One hopes that in the discussions both sides will forget the historical baggage and bureaucratic interpretations, and take a pragmatic approach to reach out for an easily identified and secured border. One approach could be to follow the watershed principle that China has accepted along its borders with Myanmar and Nepal and apply this principle not only to the Eastern Sector, but also in the Central and Western Sectors. In many ways, the watershed has been the recognised geographical border between the Indian subcontinent and the rest of Asia. Even now all the agreed points for cross border trade lie along the watershed.

Economic Linkages

Economic linkages between China and India have been the driving force towards the improvement of relations between the two. The recent visit of the Indian PM to China has given further thrust to these, and expectations will grow further. Both sides need to pursue these linkages as close economic ties often lead to closer ties in other fields, including in policies and politics. What is required, however, is that these ties transcend trade and rise to mutual investments in the economy of each other and where possible joint investment in other countries. Investments bind countries much closer than trade; because of having invested or received an investment, a country does not wish to destabilise relations with the other for fear that it would lose its investments. As linkages grow and industries collaborate, a time can come when the defence industry could also collaborate. This will take time, as the political climate between the two must improve first, to one of complete confidence in each other.

Cooperation, Co-existence or Confrontation

When one considers the future of Sino Indian relations, particularly in the strategic field, one must recognise that an element of competition between China and India is inevitable and is natural. Two large neighbours cannot live side by side without competing and to the extent the competition improves the efficiency of each, it is to the good of both. Whether the strategic balance remains static or not, will depend on how competition for influence and power in the world’s political stage develops. Much depends on how China sees its role. If, as some reports suggest, China sees itself as the only possible challenger to the U.S.A’s and aims, eventually, at becoming a second pole in a bipolar world, it would brook no other power rising in Asia. As India is the only possible contender will ensure that India is so enmeshed in its local area so it cannot rise. Such a reaction could also take place, if China sees India as part of U.S. access against China.

On the other hand, if China sees that there could be an advantage for it in a more equitable multi polar world, then China is likely to realise that the only other Asian country, which can form a pole in this multi polar world is India. If this occurs, one can expect growing cooperation in the economic field but also in the political and strategic fields.

Until, however, both countries can clearly work out their responses to the emerging world order, what one can expect in the strategic equation, is an uneasy balance with a slight tilt in China’s favour. A period of co-existence, generally peaceful but for occasional periods of strain is likely to ensue in the near future. How the countries build on this will determine the future equation between the two.