C Uday Bhaskar is the Deputy Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses. Regarded as one of the stalwarts in the arena of international relations and strategic affairs of the country, Cmde. Bhaskar is a keen observer of Sino-Indian issues. Jayanta Sarkar of Diplomatist met Cmde. Bhaskar just after the prime ministerial visit to unfurl inner dynamics of Sino-Indian relation.

I think, I need to correct the misperception — it is widely believed that Defence minister had called China as India’s Enemy No.1 after the 1998 nuclear tests. I have gone through the transcript of that interview that had appeared on the television. First of all, Mr. Fernandez did not mention China as India’s Enemy No. 1. He had said that China was the country that had to be looked at from the security aspects of India; it could be considered as a potential threat. And I think there is a very big difference between the terms potential threat and Enemy No.1. I would like to add that in the last 5 years, Sino-Indian relations have moved in to a higher level of stability.

Now specific to China, it would be valid to say that if you look at the nature of the relationship since the nuclear tests of May’98, the Kargil War of 1999 and subsequently the global and regional developments after the attack on the World Trade Centre, Pentagon in September 11, 2001, what I would call as the convergence of worldview. There has been a certain sharing of anxieties about issue such as a need for a multi-polar world order, need for a common position on issues like WTO and trade that effect developing countries. Also specific to terrorism, both China and India in different ways have a security concern: particularly, the way in which Islam has been distorted and misrepresented by some religious extremists. In China they have a potential problem in Sinkiang. We in India have our own experience with Jammu & Kashmir. In the last five years there has been an identification of areas of convergence. This is not to suggest India and China do not have differences.

We have a very complex broader problem. We have very complex territorial problems, which pertain to Tibet, Arunachal, Sikkim and so on. We have problem regarding the issues of Chinese WMD (Weapon of Mass Destruction) transfer to Pakistan. Sino-Indian relations will not reach its full potential unless we discuss the transfer of WMD  to Pakistan with some degree of candour and transparency. Having said this I would like to make a point that in the last five years, both India and China have striven consciously to maintain peace and tranquility; this is after 1993 Agreement. In fact, for the last five years the Sino-Indian boarder has been very stable, not a single bullet has been fired in anger on either side. This is a point our defence minister made to Chinese authorities in April of this year. So if you look at it in an over all context at the political level, at the strategic level, at the security level, I would say on the whole it is more positive.

That’s the global trend. Look at China and Taiwan; they have very bitter political differences. Yet, that has not prevented them to form one of the most robust trade relationships. Trade between China and Taiwan and the amount of Taiwanese investment in China is extraordinary. So political differences or security anxiety should not preclude co-operating in areas where there are mutual benefits. Therefore, I believe we should really emulate that model. We need to work towards increasing and enhancing areas of shared interests - economics, commerce and trade wherever, and then manage the differences within this spectrum. I hope, this will have positive impact even on Indo-Pack relation.

You have to acknowledge the reality. China has a GDP, which is more than twice that of India. China is a more visible economic and military power than India. Today, China’s political and military presence in the Indian periphery is much higher than the Indian presence in these countries. This is a fact. It is possible; one can make a case that China is willing to contain India in South Asia. This is one of the anxieties of India’s security establishments. But the way to deal with it is to acquire the higher level of political and economic credibility and thereby to go out and meet China in the Indian periphery. If China has a robust economic relationship with Bangladesh, the challenge for India is to meet China in Bangladesh. So India and China will then become competitors. But we must be healthy competitors.

It’s a very complex issue and it is compounded by geography, colonial history, post independence history of India and the 1962 war. Pakistan has ceded a territory to China, which does not belong to it. So, in effect there are two kinds of holdings in Kashmir that is POK— Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and COK— Chinese Occupied Kashmir. These are complex issues. It will be premature to look for a dramatic breakthrough. What could be done is if both sides agree on principles, the principle by which they would deal with each sector - western sector, central sector and eastern sector, then some progress could be made forward.

The primary objective of China and India at the moment is to improve the socio-economic conditions for one billion plus people on each side. The challenge for the leaderships in India and China is to understand territoriality in terms of national interest and national sensitivity. I believe, today, we are living in an age of globalisation, and with the changing contours of state identification territoriality should not be stressed upon to such an extent.

Now the question is how do states like India and China which are in a way the post colonial states relate to the issue of territoriality in terms of their national identity and national sensitivities? This is where I believe the political leaderships of both sides need to revisit both border and territory in such a way that a modus operandi is arrived at. Otherwise it does not behove both sides to covet territory across the border, especially the territory that is not rich in natural resources. We need to have a national mood on both sides to resolve the issue. As regards to China, we have certain bitter experiences. There is a trauma in India about 1962 war. Similarly in China there is perception that India is trying to inherit the British mantle and India has imperialist designs.

Under such circumstances, there is a need for the intelligentsia and the political leaderships of both sides to educate their own people about what kind of modus operandi is possible and about what kind of mutual accommodations are possible. I sincerely believe that we will be in a position to resolve the issue.