Iran has ruffled many feathers in the western world by asserting its intentions of using nuclear energy to generate power, and continuing with its uranium enrichment programme. A number of western powers, which include the US, France, Germany, and the UK, suspect that Iran nurses a secret agenda of developing nuclear weapons under the guise of generating civilian nuclear energy. The debatable decision on the part of Iran has raised the vexing issue of whether third world countries have the technology to develop safe comprehensive nuclear technology—which includes uranium enrichment—as sanctioned by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and thereby allowing them to go nuclear: Low-level enrichment of Uranium is used to generate electricity, but can be used as the core of an atomic weapon when more highly enriched. It is difficult to find any straightforward answer to this deceptively simple question, but there is no denying the fact that Iran has stated its legitimate right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT, of which it is a signatory (though the US and the EU-3—comprising the troika of France, Germany, and the UK—asserted in 2005 that Iran’s legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT had been forfeited by a “clandestine” nuclear programme that supposedly came to light in 2002). Iranian politicians compare its treatment as a signatory to the NPT with three nations that have not signed the NPT: Israel, India, and Pakistan; each of these nations has developed indigenous nuclear weapons capability. However, Iran has not been able to allay fears of its surreptitious nuclear agenda, and the last few months have witnessed unsuccessful diplomatic negotiations that headed for a deadlock. On 15 August 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that Iran would reject a UN resolution that was passed earlier this year, and that the Iranian people would not accept this kind of “threatening language”. He has subsequently asserted that his nation’s controversial nuclear program poses no threat to any other country, even Israel “which is a definite enemy.”

Ironically, the foundation of Iran’s nuclear programme was laid under the auspices of the US, within the framework of bilateral agreements between the US and Iran, in the late 1950s during the Cold War. Under the Atoms for Peace Programme, a civil nuclear cooperation programme was signed between Iran and the US way back in 1957. This was during the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi whose regime appeared to be sufficiently stable and friendly to the West, implying that nuclear proliferation would not be a threat. Thereafter, the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) was established in 1959, and run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). In 1967, a US-supplied 5 MW nuclear research reactor at the TNRC became operational, fuelled with highly enriched uranium. With the signing of the NPT in 1968, which was ratified in 1970, and Iran’s atomic agency functional, the Shah planned to construct nearly two dozen nuclear power stations across the country together with the USA over the next 30 years.

Iran has claimed that they want to harness civilian nuclear energy solely for generation of power and that they have no desire in developing nuclear weapons, which has been unequivocally been stated by the Iranian President. Iran’s arguments are that nuclear power is necessary for its burgeoning population, which has more than doubled in the last two decades, and its rapid industrialisation. Iran further defends its nuclear programme by stating that it has every right to diversify its sources of energy generation, especially in the light of the apprehension of eventual depletion of its oil resources. Besides, according to Iran, generating excess capacity in its oil industry will cost much, much more than harnessing nuclear power, as Iran has abundant deposits of uranium ore. This further substantiates the logic of its nuclear programme.

However, some suspect that Iran has covert intentions of developing nuclear weapons, thereby implying that the Iranian claim of harnessing nuclear energy for power generation is only a half-truth at best, and a veneer at worst. And, if the US takes a stance, can the UN be far behind? The international organisation has also joined the fray, and on 31 July 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1696, demanding Iran to suspend its nuclear activities. The resolution expressed “serious concern” at Iran’s refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and demanded that Iran “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.” The resolution does not automatically impose sanctions on Iran if it did not meet the August 31 deadline, but required the Security Council to hold further discussions before it considers sanctions. At the same time, the world body has been luring Iran with economic incentives and better relations with the west, provided Iran satisfies the rider of suspending its alleged drive of nuclear weapons, but divisions among world powers about next steps have made the Security Council less able to send a united message to Tehran. The US has taken the lead in the campaign to penalize Iran with international sanctions, but the Chinese and Russians—both with veto powers—have expressed misgivings about any move in that direction. Though Russia and China had assured in July that they would support initial sanctions against Iran if it failed to suspend aspects of its nuclear programme, but later Russia softened its stand on this matter, after Tehran agreed on talks. Russian Defence Minister Sergei B. Ivanov maintained that as long as Iran was willing to negotiate, it would be premature to penalize and economically ostracize the country. Tehran had said it would be open to negotiations but did not agree to the West’s key demand for Tehran to halt uranium enrichment as a precondition to talks.

Iran has not budged over its stand on continuing with its uranium enrichment programme, and has flouted the August 31 deadline. The IAEA has ascertained that Iran is continuing to enrich uranium at its Natanz facility. Iran has refused IAEA inspectors access to individuals who are key to answering questions about the nuclear program, and Iran has also refused or delayed requests by the inspectors to review records and take uranium samples for evaluating whether Iran’s programme might have a military aspect, by assessing the percentage of enrichment Iran has achieved. President Ahmadinejad stated that Iran “will not accept for one moment any bullying, invasion and violation of its rights,” and defiantly described the US as “the main source of the problems of mankind.” US President Bush called on other nations to help stop Iran’s nuclear ambitions; he described Iran as a “grave threat” to the world. “There must be consequences for Iran’s defiance … we must not allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons,” he said.

Although hardly unexpected, Iran’s defiance of the UN deadline officially marks the start of the Security Council debate over international sanctions against the Islamic Republic. The United Nations Security Council’s P-5 and Germany are slated to meet in Berlin in early September to discuss Iran’s stance on uranium enrichment. Despite making all the right political noises, the UN and the US are still not able to garner enough support for the proposed economic sanctions against Iran. Though EU’s stand on Iran’s uranium enrichment programme is not as strong as that of the US, it is of course not supporting the fact of Iran going independently nuclear. The EU-3 has urged Iran to permanently stall its indigenous uranium enrichment programme, in return for the Europeans’ commitment to build nuclear power plants in Iran and upgrade trade ties with the country. However, these negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran also ended in a stalemate. Iran has been firm in its view that it will not permanently renounce its right to complete the whole nuclear cycle and would enrich uranium for using it as fuel for power plants and reprocessing the spent fuel, as stipulated in the NPT.

Not surprisingly, despite the accusations of some western powers, till today there has been no substantial evidence of Iran possessing weapons of mass destruction. Iran has signed various treaties repudiating possession of them. They include the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1974, the Shah had envisioned a time when the world’s oil supply would run out, and declared, “Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn … We envision producing, as soon as possible, 23 000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants.” However, the US, too, is armed with arguments on its side. The US still insists that Iran does not need nuclear power because of its abundant oil reserves. They point out that generating nuclear power is more expensive for the Iranians than generating oil-fired power, thereby deifying the logic put across by Iran in defence of its nuclear programme. Furthermore, if one goes by a 2005 report of the United States Department of State, it would reveal that Iran has a history of belligerent attitude. According to this report, Iran commenced work on pernicious biological weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. This was despite its ratifying of the Biological Weapons Convention in August 1973. The report further stated that “available information about Iranian activities indicates a maturing offensive programme with a rapidly evolving capability that may soon include the ability to deliver these weapons by a variety of means.” Furthermore, a CIA report has alleged Iran of manufacturing and stockpiling chemical weapons, and also the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them. According to the report, during the first half of 2001, Iran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to facilitate Iran having an indigenous nerve agent (a type of lethal chemical weapon) production capability. This was despite Iran’s signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 1993 and ratifying it on November 1997, promulgating a very public stance against the use of chemical weapons, and making numerous assertions in international forums against Iraq’s use of such weapons.

If these above mentioned reports have even a smidgeon of truth, the western powers are, perhaps, justified in their paranoia and distrust of Iran’s nuclear programme. For then, a covert operation to build nuclear weapons, in the guise of harnessing nuclear energy for developmental purposes, cannot be altogether ruled out. It is now nearly half a century since the US and Iran signed their civil nuclear cooperation agreement that entailed providing for technical assistance and the lease of several kilograms of enriched uranium and also mutual cooperation on research on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But the dynamics of international diplomacy have changed drastically over the last five decades. From the bi-polar cold war era, we have moved to a unipolar world. Now the question is whether the western powers—irrespective of whether there is inherent hypocrisy or not in their motivations—are politically and morally correct in attempting to restrict Iran’s choice of power generation? Keeping in mind the fact that nuclear technology can be put to dual use—both civilian and military—the US and UN’s take on this issue cannot be said to be completely illogical, given the past track record of Iran. Moreover, the US alleges Iran of sponsoring international terrorism; with the spectre of international terrorism looming over the globe, the world cannot afford an Iran capable of nuclear weapons in the hypersensitive political region of the Middle East at any cost. Be that as it may, Iran is nonchalantly going ahead with its nuclear programme, which on its fruition may change the dynamics of the region.