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By Nicholas Hamisevicz                               

The first 40 years of bilateral ties between India and South Korea witnessed the establishment of main structures and mechanisms. The next four decades will require political will and persistent augmentation to enhance the mutual gains and influence the world order positively

India and the Republic of Korea (also known as South Korea) celebrate forty years of diplomatic relations in 2013. Despite a slow start in bilateral relations, India and South Korea now have one of the main emerging partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region. The rise in economic and political stature for both countries paved way for a more engagingbilateral relationship with one another. Having upgraded relations to a ‘strategic partnership’ in 2010, South Korea and India have the structures and platforms in place to further develop important bilateral cooperation efforts benefiting both countries. There are bumps that can slow progress between the two sides, but strong leadership and skillful use of bilateral channels can help India and South Korea influence the region and the worldmore actively during the next forty years of their diplomatic relationship.

In the beginning of their bilateral relationship, Cold War politics deterred positive interaction between India and South Korea. At the time, India, as part of the non-aligned movement, saw South Korea as too close to the United States. Conversely, South Korea viewed India’s non-alignment policies as a disguise for its real relationship with the Soviet Union, which in turn was an ally of North Korea. Despite these mutual suspicions and with some of the major powers in Asia undertaking important strategic realignments in the early 1970s, both sides established ambassadorial relations in 1973. India did this while almost simultaneously establishing relations with North Korea1.

Not even economics could bring the countries closer together early in their relationship. South Korea pushed trade with the West and Southeast Asia.On the other side, India had an inward focus and a drive for “economic self-sufficiency and a mixed economy” ensuring “economic and commercial relations remained negligible” with South Korea2. Physical, geographic barriers also prevented the two sides from having more involved interactions.

Events in the early 1990s provided new avenues for South Korea and India to interact on a more frequent basis. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, much of the impetus behind the political ideology division between South Korea and India was diminished. Furthermore, both countries underwent internal changes that were more beneficial for bilateral engagement. South Korea started consolidating its democracy, and in 1991, India began implementing reforms and opening up its economy. In addition to internal reforms, India began its “Look East” policy in 1992, hoping to boost its economy by enhancing connections with the rising economies in Southeast and Northeast Asia3. South Korean firms initially moved into the opened Indian market “with greater acumen than other Asian economies such as Japan,”4 and “became the largest Asian investor in India between 1996 and 2001.”5 However, other countries discovered opportunitiesin India as well, which reduced South Korea’s early mover advantages.

More opportunities for interaction appeared in the 2000s as the world noticed the rising importance of China, India, and the rest of Asia, especially economically. Economic development continued to drive relationships in Asia. But while economics provided an essential linkage between India and South Korea, the strategic aspects of Korea-India bilateral relations emerged as well. India began to expand the scope of its “Look East” policy to incorporate broader security issues and a larger geographic areathan just the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).6 With North Korea developing its missile and nuclear programmes with some help from Pakistan, South Korea began to pay attention to connections between Northeast and South Asia. India-South Korea discussions soon included security matters.

India and South Korea took the relationship to another level by developing permanent structures to help maintain anexpansive relationship. Once again, economics was an important factor in the initial stages. South Korea and India signed their Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2009, and it entered into effect one year later.

An important part of the political and strategic aspect of India-South Korea relations developed during 2010 as well. In January 2010, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak made a state visit to India and was the guest of honour for India’s Republic Day celebrations. During that trip, President Lee and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India agreed to upgrade the two countries’ relations to a “Strategic Partnership.”7 Bilateral meetings such as the Joint Commission and the Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue along with reciprocal visits of the respective Foreign and Defence ministers helped maintain and develop the political and security relationship envisioned in the joint statements between Prime Minister Singh and President Lee.

Additionally, South Korea secured a civil nuclear cooperation agreement when India’s President, Pratibha Devisingh Patil, travelled to Korea in July 2011. The development of India’s nuclear energy sector could provide partners important gains in trade and energy. South Korea feels the civil nuclear agreement gives it a good chance to compete against other suitors for nuclear power cooperation with India, like the United States, France, Russia and Japan.

While these current structures provide a solid base for future endeavours, there are some speed bumps that could delay progress in South Korea-India relations. First, both countries must implement the right reforms and policies to regenerate their own domestic economies. Economic development drives relations in Asia, and if both India and South Korea are struggling economically, emphasising bilateral trade relations with one another becomes more difficult. India and South Korea set a goal of reaching $40 billion in trade by 2015, and the two sides will have to pick up the pace to reach that target. Moreover, if the POSCO steel project and investment in the Indian state of Odisha remains delayed, it could discourage other Korean companies from undertaking big investment projects in India.

Second, both India and South Korea have uncertainties with the future of their neighbours that could force much of their foreign policy to be focused close to home. For India, the United States will be removing troops from Afghanistan, leaving anunknown security concern as well as an area potentially viable for foreign influence. Pakistan still remains in a precarious political situation where the stability of a democratically elected government remains unclear, including in its ability to protect itself and others like India from terrorists operating inside Pakistan. For South Korea, Kim Jong-un and the leadership in North Korea continue to take belligerent actions that threaten its neighbours. Moreover, the successful rocket launch and third nuclear test also suggest North Korea is getting closer to directly threatening the US. An escalation of tensions, a potential war with North Korea, or even a collapse of the North Korean government could restrain South Korea’s ability to fully engage with its strategic partner.

Lastly, there could be a change in the perception from the leaders in both countries on how to handle a rising China. Currently, there is a general idea in both countries that they need the economic relationship with China; however, the security dimension is worrisome, and thus, other allies and partners are needed as a hedge. Yet there could come a time when leaders in both India and South Korea feel China’s rise is inevitable and solid relations with China will be necessary for important interaction in Asia. The two countries could start a process where the relationship with China is perceived as so vital that new projects and future enhancements in the security and political arenas don’t matriculate in order to maintain positive relations with China.

Fortunately, the main structures and mechanisms established in recent years will help India and South Korea avoid these bumps, or at the very least, prevent them from being roadblocks, in their relationship. Currentconvergences will coalesce around the CEPA, the nuclear agreement, and the strategic partnership. Future meetings, projects, and even multilateral opportunities will stem from this comprehensive framework the two sides have built.

With the world anticipating an Asia-Pacific century, strong leadership will be needed to expand South Korea-India relations even further. Fortunately, the new South Korean President, Park Geun-hye, has called for strengthening the strategic partnership with India in her campaign and recently visited the Indian Ambassador to South Korea, Vishnu Prakash. Because the strategic nature of their relationship is still relatively new, it will require leaders in both countries to emphasise the need to arrange visits, promote trade and work together with each other. In addition to strong leadership, a few big wins or newsworthy events like movement on the POSCO investment, greater nuclear cooperation opportunities, or a large military purchase could also help advance relations to another level.

The geostrategic landscape has changed to view the area from the Middle East through the Indian Ocean and along into East Asia as vitally important for economic and political stability. India and South Korea, as democracies near the edges of that strategic space, can enhance the possibilities for a peaceful and prosperous region and world. The two countries have the structures in place after their first forty years of relations. Now, through strong leadership and constant augmentation of their relationship, India and South Korea can create more mutual gains and influence the international arena in a positive way during their next forty years.

Nicholas Hamisevicz is the Director of Research and Academic Affairs for the Korea Economic Institute of America. Views expressed are personal.

1. David Brewster, “India’s Developing Relationship with South Korea: A Useful Friend in East Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 2, March/April 2010, page 406 & Walter Andersen, “Korea: An Important Part of India’s “Look East” Policy,” US-Korea Institute at SAIS Working Paper Series, January 2008, page 5 at http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/USKI-WP0801.pdf (February 26, 2013).

2. Dhruva Jaishankar, “India & South Korea: The Promise of Partnership,” Korea Compass, Korea Economic Institute, May 2012, at http://www.keia.org/publication/india-south-korea-promise-partnership (February 25, 2013)

3. David Brewster, “India’s Developing Relationship with South Korea: A Useful Friend in East Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 2, March/April 2010, page 410.

4. Chung Min Lee, “Coping with Giants; South Korea’s Responses to China’s and India’s Rise,” in Strategic Asia 2011-12 Asia Responds to its Rising Powers: China and India, edited by Ashley Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough, National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle and Washington, DC; 2011: page 71.

5. David Brewster, “India’s Developing Relationship with South Korea: A Useful Friend in East Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 2, March/April 2010, page 410.

6. Raja Mohan, “Look East Policy: Phase Two,” The Hindu, October 9, 2003, at http://www.hindu.com/2003/10/09/stories/2003100901571000.htm (February 25, 2013).

7. “India-Republic of Korea Joint Statement: Towards a Strategic Partnership,” January 25, 2010, at http://www.idsa.in/resources/documents/India-KoreaJointStatement.25.1.10 (February 25, 2013).

               

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