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Tale of Two Nuclear Deals

 

                          

The Indo-US nuclear deal finally took wings after George W. Bush, the U.S. President signed the legislation on 8, October. It is now officially called the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act.

 


Even as the US Congress was endorsing the India-specific U.S. legislation for civil nuclear energy cooperation at the Capitol Hill on 2 October the U.S. envoy Christopher Hill was holding parleys in North Korea for solving another nuclear puzzle— that of stopping North Korea’s (DPRK) re-nuclearisation, after the de-sealing of its nuclear facilities in September. The de-sealing was done at Pyongyang’s behest and led to the withdrawal of IAEA inspectors from Yongbyon.

The Indo-US nuclear deal finally took wings after George W. Bush, the U.S. President signed the legislation on 8, October. It is now officially called the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act.

While the US considered India as a suitable candidate for the nuclear deal, by virtue of being a responsible player, despite not signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in north Korea’s case, the US made a neat somersault and dropped it from the list of “terrorist countries”.

As recently as 11 October, the US made a diplomatic pronouncement, dropping North Korea from the blacklist, which the State Department officials later described as a logical quid pro quo for the inspection agreement and in the “best interests of national security and consistent with the ‘action for action’ principle of the negotiations”.

It was in September, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) de-sealed and removed all surveillance-gadgets from the DPRK’s reprocessing plant at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. The plant was earlier sealed under the supervision of IAEA inspectors and was in line with the SPT agreements. The Six-Party Talks (SPT) formulae provide for steps to “disable” the DPRK’s known nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. And, “disablement” is a prelude to their permanent “dismantlement” under the overall “denuclearisation” package in respect of North Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear-weapons programme.

North Korea Imbroglio

North Korea’s “denuclearisation,” had been a challenge not only to the US but also to the lead players in the Six-Party Talks (SPT). The SPT comprises the U.S., DPRK, China as Chair of the talks, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. Barring DPRK, all are NSG members and are party to the recent India-specific consensus, which allowed India access to materials, equipment, and know-how in the civil nuclear energy sector.

Surprisingly, the same group of countries in the Asia region, which joined hands to give their approval to a pro-India consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), are working hard again to prevent Pyongyang’ s “re-nuclearisation”.

Big Ticket Diplomacy

For India, the Indo-US Nuclear deal came handy in getting out of 34 years of nuclear isolation and opened up the way to trade in civilian nuclear technology not just with the US but also with other countries such as France and Russia. As a double delight, France has already inked a pact with India. Russia too has expressed a keenness to cooperate with India.

The US ambassador to India, David C Mulford, described the deal as the “greatest diplomatic initiative by the US,” and maintained that the 123 agreement would govern nuclear cooperation between India and the US.

“The content of the 123 agreement has been preserved...there were no amendments and the agreement faithfully honours the general outlines of the July 2005 statement,” he said.

However, Mr. Mulford maintained that fuel supply guarantees would not be legally binding on US companies. “In the 123 agreement, which is going to be a law, not every single commitment is binding because that can’t be,” he said and added that the US government cannot compel US companies to do things like guarantee of fuel supplies.

The shot in the arm was the much-needed NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) waiver, enabling India to carry out nuclear business and ended the seclusion enforced since the Pokharan nuclear tests in the year 1974.

The 123 agreement seeks consultations between the US and India, if nuclear fuel supply is disrupted to India for any reason. In fact, it states the US would convene a meeting of other ‘friendly’ countries like the UK, Russia, and France to ensure that India’s fuel needs are met - in other words, it is quite contrary to what the senate panel’s bill seeks to do.

 

Reservations of China

China, a prominent member of the 45-nation grouping (NSG), remained equivocal over supporting the nuke deal between India and US but backed “peaceful” use of atomic energy by all nations.

Australia too made it clear that it has reservations in the matter of supply of uranium to India saying that as part of its “long standing” policy, it would never supply the material to a non-nuclear non-proliferation treaty country such as India.

Stephen Smith, Australian Foreign Minister, in his visit to India announced that the long-standing policy of his country not to supply uranium to a non-NPT country was well known. However, it would not affect relations with India. Australia, is a key member of the NSG, and owns almost 40 percent of the uranium reserves of the world.

It may look ironic that in both cases the NSG members were displaying a common concern. The main thread in both cases was to ensure that there should not be any further nuclear testing by both India and North Korea. In the case of India, NSG members were convinced that India would resolutely adhere to its unilateral moratorium on further nuclear weapon testing. On North Korea, there is no explicit commitment. Truly, it was an October revolution of sorts in nuclear diplomacy.


 

           

 

 
 
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