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Myanmar
Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi and her fellow National League for Democracy (NLD)
party candidates must now get down to business. Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD party
swept 43 of the 45 seats in the recent by-elections in Myanmar. But the new NLD
members of Parliament, including Aung San Suu Kyi herself, immediately found
themselves embroiled in an argument about a clause in the oath that requires
‘safeguarding’ the constitution – a pledge they were unprepared to take. The
pledge is itself a part of the constitution (in an annex), and changing it
requires a constitutional amendment, a procedure requiring a three-quarter
majority in parliament. At the behest of her party followers, however, Suu Kyi
finally relented and agreed to take her Parliamentary oath. This was the right
decision. The alternative – amending the constitution – would have been
politically impossible. Moreover, the term ‘safeguard’ does not preclude the
possibility of future amendments. The term is in line with other constitutions,
including that of the United States. Notwithstanding oaths to “protect the
constitution,” American presidents have presided over 27 constitutional
amendments. Myanmar’s Parliamentarians, one would hope, recognise that they have
the authority, even the duty, to change the constitution as circumstances
demand. More important, Aung San Suu Kyi’s decision to proceed with taking the
oath marked her as a pragmatist willing to reform the system from within. This
is consistent with her other statements regarding her intention to work with the
current regime to improve the country’s social and economic situation. It will
also build a spirit of cooperation between the ‘big three,’ Aung San Suu Kyi,
President Thein Sein, and parliamentary leader Shwe Mann, into a critical
coalition of like-minded reformists to overcome the huge challenges the country
faces.
A key obstacle to reform will be the military, which is the main beneficiary of
the current rentier state. Its implicit support will be essential in reforming
the economy and reducing the reams of red tape and bureaucratic restrictions
that create the rents that those in power then exploit. To bring along the
military while also reforming the economy is the biggest single political
challenge facing Myanmar. The delicate task of working around political
obstacles and deeply entrenched vested interests will require a combination of
political savvy and committed leadership that the big three can bring to bear.
For this reason, big-bang reforms are out of the question. Instead, Myanmar
requires slow and steady change that liberalises economic activity at the margin
and gradually reduces the role of the state, making it easier to reduce its grip
on economic activity over the course of time. It is important that the initial
reforms register quick wins in the form of increased economic activity and
visible effects on peoples’ welfare. In this, the Burmese would do well to learn
from China’s post-1978 transition to a market economy and contrast it with the
Soviet Union’s disastrous Perestroika.
Thailand
Thailand has witnessed an upsurge in violence in its unsettled south. More
repression will not work. The government and the military need to adopt a
different strategy. On March 31, two separate and apparently coordinated bomb
explosions killed fourteen people and wounded hundreds more in Yala Province in
southern Thailand, making March the region’s most violent month in recent years
(73 violent incidents led to 56 deaths and injured 547 others). These incidents
mark a worrying deterioration in the long-simmering conflict in the troubled,
Malay-dominated southern provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani. Since the
insurgency flared in January 2004, it has claimed the lives of some 5,000 people
and injured over 8,000. In last year’s election campaign, Prime Minister
Yingluck Shinawatra opened the possibility of some form of autonomy for the
three southern provinces as well as including them in a special economic zone.
Police Colonel Tawee Sodsong, the prime minister’s recently appointed secretary
general of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre, also raised the
possibility of some form of self-rule and lifting the emergency decree that
allows detaining suspects for more than thirty days and gives government
official immunity from prosecution.
These tentative signals, however, were dismissed by Army Commander General
Prayuth as contrary to the army’s position of an ‘indivisible’ Thailand. The
media also reported that ex-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the current prime
minister’s brother, was in Malaysia recently for talks with Prime Minister Najib
Razak, where he also met with exiled Malay leaders for so-called peace
negotiations. If true, it is difficult to imagine a less likely approach to
peace, since it was Thaksin Shinawatra’s heavy-handed actions as the country’s
leader in 2004 that fanned the flames of insurgency in the first place.
Thailand’s southern insurgency has never been jihadist or religious in nature.
It has always been about alienation – economic and cultural – as well as
perceived social and economic injustice. The Thai government and the army must
recognise this. It will be almost impossible to turn the clock back to the days
when southern Thailand was peaceful without a formal political agreement. A
military solution has been tried for many years and failed. Indeed, all it seems
to have done is further alienate the local people. More repression will not
work.
Prime Minister Yingluck’s desire to bring about an end to the insurgency in
southern Thailand should be taken at face value. But her room for manoeuvring is
limited by the army on one side and the shadow of her brother on the other. Both
should back off and give her space to bring about a lasting peace. She has been
right in seeking the support of Prime Minister Najib to achieve this. It is in
the interest of both countries to bring this long-simmering conflict to an end.
There is little alternative left apart from direct or indirect negotiations with
the insurgents (for example, by bringing in an international mediator, such as
the United Nations) and the final agreement will very likely have to include a
certain degree of autonomy, a recognition of Thailand’s diversity, and measures
that support the economic development of the affected provinces.
Philippines
President Benigno S Aquino III has been locked in a battle with the country’s
Supreme Court, which he considers an impediment to his anti-corruption programme,
especially in bringing corruption charges against the previous president, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. The chief justice of the Supreme Court, Renato Corona, was
appointed by Arroyo a week after Aquino was elected and a few weeks before he
assumed office. Prior to that, Renato Corona had served as Arroyo’s chief of
staff, spokesman, and acting executive secretary. Arroyo’s ‘midnight’
appointment of Corona was seen by many as an obvious attempt to protect herself
against legal action by her successor.
President Aquino ran and won his 2010 campaign on an anti-poverty,
anti-corruption platform. His campaign slogan, “there is no poverty without
corruption,” directly placed the blame for the country’s stubbornly high poverty
rate at the door of its endemic corruption. He made effective and honest
governance the centrepiece of his development agenda. The Aquino
administration’s new Philippine Development Plan prioritises effectiveness,
transparency and accountability in public service delivery, scaling up
anti-corruption efforts, enhancing the rule of law, and expanding citizens’
access to information and participation. Improvements in bidding procedures,
especially in the construction of roads and highways, seem to have paid
dividends by lowering costs by a third. As part of this campaign, he launched
impeachment proceedings against the anticorruption ombudsman, Merceditas
Navarro-Gutierrez, who resigned days before her trial was to begin in the
Senate.
The separate impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Renato Corona also
need to be seen within this broader agenda. Initially the complaint against the
chief justice had eight articles of impeachment, covering three broad areas:
betrayal of the public trust, violation of the constitution, and graft and
corruption. Five of these have since been dropped. The Senate is in the midst of
the impeachment proceedings and a final decision is expected in June.
The Philippine Supreme Court has now bared its teeth by ordering that about
4,335 hectares of the Hacienda Luisita estate, belonging to President Aquino’s
family, be distributed to 6,296 farmers and their families that have worked the
land for decades. It was President Aquino’s mother, Corazon Aquino, who made
land reform the centrepiece of her 1986 campaign for president. Congress passed
the Comprehensive Land Reform Law in 1988, and in May 1989, the 7,000 tenants of
the Aquino family estate, Hacienda Luisita, agreed to take a third of the
hacienda’s corporate stock instead of the land itself. Since two-thirds of the
corporate stock remained with the Aquino family, effective control of the
hacienda and its land remained with the family.
In November 2011, the Supreme Court rescinded the stock distribution option and
overwhelmingly voted to distribute the land to those tilling the soil. The
latest ruling in April not only confirms the earlier decision, but sets the land
transfer at 1989 prices (when the stock option was exercised), rather than the
2006 prices that the Aquino family was seeking. The difference is significant—at
1989 prices, the value of the land comes to a mere 196 million Philippine pesos;
at 2006 prices, it could be anywhere between 5-10 billion pesos.
Although President Benigno Aquino sold his interests in Hacienda Luisita before
the presidential election in 2010, it is important he uses his influence with
his family so they cooperate fully with the Supreme Court decision. The
president has made the rule of law the central platform of his presidency. His
family now needs to observe the same principles the president himself has
trumpeted.
Indeed, the Aquino family could prolong the case further by not cooperating with
the Department of Agrarian Reform, the agency responsible for implementing the
Supreme Court’s decision. But this would damage the president and his efforts to
clean up the government. The nation is watching. He needs to make sure that no
one – not even the family of the sitting president – is above the law. Moreover,
there are fifteen other major land reform cases pending, and the outcome of
Hacienda Luisita case will significantly affect the outcome of those that
follow. Land reform, and breaking up the stranglehold the Philippine oligarch
families have on the land, is not only central to improving the livelihoods of
the rural poor, but also accelerating broader economic progress. The president
and his family should lead the way.
Malaysia
The prospect of upcoming elections is raising political temperatures in
Malaysia.There has been growing speculation that the thirteenth Malaysian
general elections will be held in June this year. But massive demonstrations in
Kuala Lumpur on April 28 organised by Bersih (a civil society coalition for
clean and fair elections) that ended in tear gas and pitched street battles, may
have thrown a spanner in the government’s plans. The inevitable finger pointing
between Bersih and the police that followed (some 380 people were arrested,
significantly less than a similar rally last year) masks the more important
point that there is popular belief that the election system is rigged in favour
of the ruling Barisan Nasional.
The Election Commission has been at pains to announce that it has implemented
many of the recommendations of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Electoral
Reforms, which conducted a genuine and nationwide consultative process. One
recommendation being implemented is the use of indelible ink to prevent voter
fraud, a recommendation put forward by Bersih itself. The Election Commission
also scrutinised the electoral rolls and found few irregularities, but so deep
is the distrust in the country that this result appears to have carried little
credibility. The accuracy of the electoral poll in Malaysia is indeed a critical
matter that must be beyond reproach. There are several swing states where small
margins can change the national result significantly.
In the meantime, Prime Minister Najib has embarked on a charm offensive. He
fulfilled an earlier promise by repealing the Internal Security Act, which
allowed for preventive detention without trial. The government also passed a law
that allows students to join political parties (although political events on
campuses are still banned).
These actions no doubt will positively impact the prime minister’s popularity,
which was already high following a populist budget and a recent report
complimenting the government on the implementation of its economic reform
package. But while the prime minister enjoys very favourable ratings in the
polls, his party, Barisan Nasional, does not. This has given the opposition
parties some hope, although they have yet to coalesce and offer a clear
alternative. The scenes over the weekend of street protests and tear gas,
together with allegations of police brutality, will likely help the opposition
and hurt the government. This could further narrow the difference between the
incumbent Barisan Nasional and the main opposition coalition. All the tea leaves
suggest a close race, perhaps closer than the one in 2008 when the opposition
took five of thirteen state legislatures and over a third of the seats in
parliament, denying the Barisan Nasional a two-thirds majority.
Rising Tensions in the South China Sea
The Philippines spat with China in the Scarborough shoals of the South China Sea
helped focus the 2+2 strategic dialogue in Washington between the Philippines
and the United States.
As a curtain raiser to President Aquino’s trip to the United States, the
strategic dialogue between Foreign Secretary Alberto del Rosario and Defence
Secretary Voltaire Gazmin from the Philippines and the Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta of the United States was
held on April 30. This was the first such strategic talks held between the two
countries and reflects their growing cooperation following America’s
‘rebalancing’ of its foreign policy toward Asia and the Pacific. The talks
focussed on how the Philippines could project a minimum credible defence posture
to protect its territorial integrity.
The ongoing stand-off in the Scarborough shoals in which eight Chinese fishing
vessels were caught fishing in waters claimed by the Philippines highlighted how
ill-equipped the country is to protect its maritime interests, especially
against a more assertive China. As of this writing, there were four Chinese
ships (three maritime surveillance vessels and one fisheries enforcement vessel)
at the scene, compared to just three from the Philippines, which includes the
forty-year-old cutter Gregorio del Pilar recently acquired from the United
States.
Although the 2+2 talks confirmed that a second high endurance American cutter
would be delivered to the Philippines shortly, the most significant outcome of
the talks was a tripling of US military financing, and a reaffirmation that the
United States would honour its obligations under the Mutual Defence Treaty. The
Treaty’s Article IV states clearly that “each Party recognises that an armed
attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety.” While this does not guarantee that the United States will
come to the defence of the Philippines if the latter is attacked by a third
party, it certainly increases the probability by declaring such an attack a
danger to the safety of the United States itself. At the same time, however, the
Philippines may need reminding that the treaty does not cover the disputed South
China Sea islands and shoals which the Philippines did not even claim at the
time the treaty was signed in 1951.
Also, revealingly, the United States committed to help the Philippines expand
and improve its capability to withstand cyber attacks, suggesting this is
vulnerability in the Philippine defence posture. Finally, the United States and
the Philippines continue to cooperate under the Security Engagement Board
framework to combat non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, piracy
and insurgencies, and have expanded their relationship to also cover disaster
relief, climate change, deforestation, and preservation of fisheries resources.
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