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In Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) foreign relations since Kim
Jong-Il’s death, what was most impressive in the initial days and weeks of the
new regime were the Chinese efforts of doing all it could to contribute to the
maintenance of the internal stability of North Korea in Kim Jong-Un’s untested
beginning in power. Two days after Kim Jong-Il’s death, The New York Times
reported, “China moves to ensure stability in North Korea” … “China is moving
quickly to deepen its influence over senior officials in North Korea ... to try
to ensure stability in the isolated nation, according to Chinese and foreign
former government officials and analysts.” The next day, upon President Hu
Jintao’s early morning trip to DPRK embassy in Beijing to offer his condolences
on the death of Kim Jong-Il and reconfirm his support of Kim Jong-Un as the
successor, Associate Press commented “China moved swiftly to assure its
communist ally of its strong support amid an uncertain leadership transition.”
Toward the end of February, China agreed (or perhaps even offered) to grant more
than 240,000 tonns of food aid to North Korea, though nine months ago in his
father’s last visit to China, the Chinese leaders politely refused to extend
generous economic grant.
However, just like what happened at times in China-DPRK relations, Pyongyang’s
attitude toward Beijing in this critical juncture was almost completely
incompatible with what Beijing took toward it and surely expected from it,
ushering a presently still ongoing period of bilateral relations largely
opposite to that since autumn 2009, which could be called a ‘renaissance’ or
virtually a “renewal of the alliance.” China’s disillusion, in fact, began
initially with Kim’s death itself: the new regime in Pyongyang did not inform
the Chinese leaders of this paramount event in time, or they probably did not
know it until the whole world did, though just as a former US State Department
official rightly said at the time that Chinese leaders “want to be the best
informed...and have people consulting with them at this moment.”
This unfriendliness would continue. China over seven months was never consulted
and even informed in time about any major action taken by Kim Jong-Un’s regime
in which China had direct or indirect stakes, including the surprising (and
short-lived) trade-off agreement between the United States and North Korea
announced on February 29, the North Korea declaration on March 16 that it would
launch a satellite in mid-April (which surely violated UN Security Council’s
sanction resolution against North Korea nuclear arms programme), and the launch
itself conducted on April 13, despite China’s persuasion and opposition. China
surely had not anticipated that the new ruler in Pyongyang, whose succession
China had supported without any major reservation, would not abide by the
“commitment” his father made in the face of Hu Jintao in early May 2010 that
both sides would intimately and, at all times, inform each other of their
respective major policies, both domestic and international.
China - From Expectation to Disillusion and Anger
This time China had a shorter temper. Though, like always, the Chinese
government appealed to everyone for moderation and calming down after North
Korea declared and conducted the rocket launch, it gave vent to its constrained
anger in a collective way when the UN Security Council crafted a Chairperson
Statement on April 16 not only condemning the rocket launch very strongly, but
also, remarkably, tightening further the UN sanctions against North Korea, a
sort of action unprecedented in the previous similar occasion. According to The
Washington Post, this Statement “was largely developed in a series of
closed-door meetings between US Ambassador to UN Susan Rice and China’s UN
ambassador, Li Baodong.” “This is more than I expected,” said David Albright,
the President of the US-based Institute for Science and International Security …
“It shows there is some desire to seriously start to pressure North Korea within
the confines established by China.”
Moreover, the Chinese government’s anger was not only collective, but also
bilateral and unilateral. It is widely believed that Hu Jintao, while receiving
a visiting North Korea high official in late April, sternly warned against any
possibility of North Korea’s third nuclear test, and even supposedly threatened
to reconsider the general relationship with Pyongyang if the new regime dared to
do it again. One month later, surely with almost unprecedentedly obtained
instruction (or at least permission) from high authorities, the Chinese media
widely publicised the plight of 28 Chinese fishermen who were kidnapped, robbed,
stripped and held for 13 days by North Korean soldiers. This immediately
inflamed a large part of the Chinese public opinion, turning it decidedly
against North Korea. Almost never before, “the testy state of China-North Korea
affairs became public” – by the Chinese government.
Recent Drastic Warming towards Beijing
Suddenly, following the sacking of Vice Marshal Ri Yong-Ho, North Korean army
chief and Kim Jong-Un’s former mentor, on 15 July, there is drastic warming of
the regime’s attitude towards China, which is likely to begin another round of
vicissitudes of Beijing-Pyongyang relations. Breaking the persistent lack of
lip-service to China-DPRK friendship, the new and very powerful Vice Marshal
Choe Ryong-Hae suddenly declared to a ‘central’ mass rally organised in
Pyongyang on July 27 to celebrate the 59th anniversary of “the victory of the
Korean Liberation War” (the Korean Armistice) that North Korea would never
forget one thing: China sent its troops to fight shoulder to shoulder with North
Korea during the war and thereby “set the noble model of internationalism.”
Only a week later, Kim Jong-Un, in his first reception of a foreign delegation
since taking power, met a high-level visiting Chinese official Wang Jiarui, head
of the Foreign Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party and a Chinese top envoy on North Korean affairs, saying it was
the “unswerving will” of North Korea to deepen the bilateral friendship. This
meeting raised speculation that he might visit China sometime soon. Then, with
an extraordinarily quick pace, Uncle Jang Song-Thaek, the “mastermind behind Mr
Kim’s recent attempts to tame the military,” arrived at Beijing on August 13
with a big delegation to discuss the DPRK-China joint development and management
of the Rason and Hwanggumphyong economic zones, followed by Pyongyang’s
concession to China on some major policy about the project. It seems that the
entangled alliance might be re-renewed.
Understanding the Changed Attitude in a Broader Context
To understand the drastic warming of Pyongyang’s attitude towards China, one has
to place this into a broader context. The events that happened in the seven
months after Kim Jong-Il’s death and during the consolidating of his son’s new
regime indicate that among several fundamental state policies, i.e., that of the
dynastic dictatorship, “military first,” nuclear arms and missile development,
and very intensive hostility against ROK, only “military first” has begun to be
demoted by the new regime substantially. What prompted this demotion? The
reasons are many - For the dynastic power interest as well as its financial
revenue, for societal stability of the dynastic state, for the nationalistic and
statist aspiration to become an invincible “powerful and prosperous country”, as
declared by the Pyongyang regime often, and also for addressing the country’s
dire economic situation, which is, without doubt, potentially threatening the
long-term survival of the dynastic state, let alone its power aspiration. So,
this remarkable beginning of the demotion of “military first” seems to have its
economic reformist implications or accompaniments. And, easily understandable,
for all this is a warmer relationship with China as the provider of economic
help and perhaps also a limited adviser for intended reformist measures, which
is the only external asset available at the present stage and even longer.
However, the dynastic dictatorial principle, nuclear weapons and missile
programme and very strong hostility against ROK have been largely kept intact,
or have even deteriorated. Till now, there have been recent events of the
drastic warming towards China, probably for both tactical and strategic reasons.
It is relatively easier to understand the rationale for North Korea’s unchanged
aspects, having enormous discussions and literature on its fundamental nature of
state, ideology, political culture, and rigid traditions.
There are speculations about possible future options or possible prospects of
Kim Jong-Un’s regime: Reformist and non-dictatorial, peaceful, and non-nuclear?
Return to the old, Kim Jong-Il styled rule (especially restoring “military
first” to its overwhelming position)? And continuing the present “dichotomy
course” – a limited reformist state, but still dictatorial, non-peaceful and
nuclear? In this early stage, with all the self-conscious tentativeness and
sombre doubts, what we could say is:
• The first option has only a very limited possibility, based mainly on hope and
respect for surprise in human affairs, while taking into account the bleak
history and oft-proven nature of Pyongyang regime;
• The second one is uncertain, but not very likely, partly because of the
emergence of the ‘progressive’ indications and their inherent logic; and,
• The last one is probable, for all the facts and analysis we have in recent
months. Of course, its international implication will be enormous as well as
quite dynamic, with mutually opposite aspects for China-DPRK relations in the
future.
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